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As a result of the ongoing civil war in Syria, more than 146,000 
people have been killed1 and at least six million people have fled 
their homes.2 Over nine million people are in need of humanitarian 
assistance.3 On August 21, 2013, the Syrian government is said to 
have used chemical weapons, killing an estimated 1,300 of its own 
civilians.4 Over the course of the ongoing three-year civil war, the 
United Nations Security Council has only passed three minor 
resolutions and a February 2014 resolution calling for humanitarian 
aid access.5 During the civil war, the Security Council has neither 
issued sanctions nor authorized military force to assist the people of 
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1. Noah Rayman, Report: More than 146,000 People Killed in Syrian Civil 
War, TIME (Mar. 13, 2014), http://time.com/24077/syria-death-toll/.  
2. UN Off. for the Coordination of Humanitarian Aff., Syria Crisis, 
http://syria.unocha.org/ (last visited Apr. 5, 2014). 
3. Id.  
4.  Press Release, White House Office of the Press Secretary, Government 
Assessment of the Syrian Government’s Use of Chemical Weapons on Aug. 21, 
2013 (Aug. 30, 2013) (on file with the author).  
5. See S.C. Res. 2042, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2042, at 1–2 (Apr. 14, 2012) 
(authorizing UN advance team to monitor ceasefire in Syria); S.C. Res. 2043, U.N. 
Doc. S/RES/2043, at 1–2 (Apr. 21, 2012) (authorizing UN observer mission in 
Syria); S.C. Res. 2118, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2118, at 1–2 (Sept. 27, 2013) (requiring 
expeditious and verifiable destruction of Syria’s chemical weapons); S.C. Res. 
2139, U.N. Doc. S/RES/2139 (Feb. 22, 2014) (urging all member states to offer 
humanitarian aid to people affected by the crisis). 
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Syria. The Security Council’s failure to take any significant action 
has led to strong criticisms of the Responsibility to Protect doctrine 
(commonly referred to as R2P),6 an emerging international norm 
which asserts that if sovereign states cannot fulfill their responsibility 
to protect their citizens from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, 
and crimes against humanity, the international community has the 
responsibility to protect those citizens by taking collective action.7  
When R2P was first introduced and adopted by most of the 
international community nearly a decade ago, the still-developing 
norm was heralded for its potential to be recognized as a well-
established international norm.8 Today, while R2P’s tenets are nearly 
universally accepted, the scope of its implementation remains highly 
contested, particularly the issue of whether to authorize military force 
to intervene in a state when prevention of mass atrocities has failed.9 
The first time the international community used R2P to authorize 
military force was NATO’s intervention in Libya in 2011, acting on 
Security Council Resolution 1973.10 While Western states and R2P’s 
strongest proponents celebrated the quick and decisive action in 
Libya as a high-watermark for R2P,11 numerous developing 
countries, most notably Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa 
(the BRICS), criticized the intervention.12 The BRICS believed 
 
6. The Crisis in Syria, INT’L COALITION FOR THE RESP. TO PROTECT, 
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-syria (last visited 
Nov. 13, 2013). 
7. 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶¶ 138–39, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/60/1 (Sept. 16, 2005). 
8. See U.N. Secretary-General, A More Secure World: Our Shared 
Responsibility: Rep. of the High-Level Panel on Threats, Challenges, and Change, 
¶ 203, U.N. Doc. A/59/565 (Dec. 2, 2004) (endorsing the norm). 
9. Gareth Evans, R2P Down but Not Out After Libya and Syria, OPEN 
DEMOCRACY (Sept. 9, 2013), http://www.opendemocracy.net/openglobalrights/gare 
th-evans/r2p-down-but-not-out-after-libya-and-syria. 
10. Herman Schaper, Responsibility to Protect: An Emerging Principle, INT’L 
COALITION FOR THE RESP. TO PROTECT (June 28, 2011), http://www.responsibilityt 
oprotect.org/index.php/component/content/article/35-r2pcs-topics/3554-qresponsib 
ility-to-protect-an-emerging-principleq. 
11. See Ramesh Thakur, Libya and the Responsibility to Protect: Between 
Opportunistic Humanitarianism and Value-Free Pragmatism, 7 SECURITY 
CHALLENGES 13, 19 (Summer 2011), available at http://www.securitychallenges.or 
g.au/ArticlePDFs/vol7no4Thakur.pdf (“In Libya, it took just one month to mobilise 
a broad coalition, secure a UN mandate to protect civilians, establish and enforce 
no-fly and no-drive zones, and stop Gaddafi’s advancing army and prevent a 
massacre of the innocents in Benghazi.”). 
12. Id. at 21–22. 
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NATO overstepped the mandate by engaging in regime change.13 As 
a result, in November 2011, Brazil introduced the concept of 
Responsibility while Protecting (RwP), which reaffirmed R2P’s 
emphasis on prevention, and proposed criteria, such as last resort and 
balance of consequences, to be considered before the Security 
Council mandates the use of military force.14 RwP also calls for a 
monitoring-and-review mechanism to provoke debate regarding the 
implementation of a resolution.15  
This comment argues that to increase the potential success and 
fuller recognition of R2P as an international norm, R2P should 
embrace the core arguments set forth in RwP.  Otherwise, non-
Western countries will continue to be hesitant to get involved in 
human rights crises, as evidenced by the conflict in Syria. Part I of 
this article will examine the development of R2P, consider the 
important documents that have shaped the doctrine, and briefly 
analyze R2P’s role in both Libya and Syria, as a way of 
understanding how RwP emerged as a concept.16 Part II of this article 
will provide an overview of RwP, consider its key tenets, and 
compare RwP to R2P, arguing that RwP was not meant to be a 
competing norm, but should instead be embraced as a means of 
dialogue on improving R2P.17 Part III will consider how the 
incorporation of RwP into R2P would beneficially shape the future of 
R2P as an international norm.18  
 
13. Oliver Stuenkel, BRICS and the ‘Responsibility While Protecting’ Concept, 
THE HINDU (Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/article29851 
90.ece. 
14. Id. Last resort is the international precautionary principle that “[m]ilitary 
intervention can only be justified when every non-military option for the prevention 
or peaceful resolution of the crisis has been explored.” Int’l Comm’n on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty [ICISS], The Responsibility to Protect, at xii 
(Dec. 2001), available at http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/ICISS%20Report.pdf. 
Balance of consequences means that the result of the intervention should cause less 
peril than that of inaction. Evans, supra note 9. 
15. Stuenkel, supra note 13.  Monitoring-and-review is a mechanism through 
which states in the Security Council “discuss and debate the implementation of any 
ongoing R2P action.” Stewart M. Patrick, R2P on Life Support: Humanitarian 
Norms vs. Practical Realities in Syria, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (June 12, 2013), 
http://blogs.cfr.org/patrick/2013/06/12/r2p-on-life-support-humanitarian-norms-vs-
practical-realities-in-syria/. 
16. See infra Part I. 
17. See infra Part II. 
18. See infra Part III. 
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I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF R2P 
 
A. Emergence of R2P at the International Commission on 
Intervention and State Sovereignty 
The R2P principle was introduced in the December 2001 report 
of the International Commission on Intervention and State 
Sovereignty (ICISS), an independent, Canadian-sponsored 
commission.19 The catalyst of ICISS’s report was NATO’s 
intervention in Kosovo without Security Council authorization,20 
though the doctrine also arose out of the large-scale tragedies of the 
twentieth-century, namely the Holocaust, the killing fields of 
Cambodia, and the genocides in Rwanda and Srebrenica.21 
Additionally, ICISS was formed to answer the question put forth by 
then-Secretary General Kofi Annan: “[I]f humanitarian intervention 
is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we 
respond to a Rwanda, to a Srebrenica—to gross and systematic 
violations of human rights that offend every precept of our common 
humanity?”22 Secretary General Annan’s question highlighted the 
tension between two leading principles of international law: The first 
is that states have the inherent right to sovereignty, which provides 
the ability to govern without international interference in domestic 
affairs, including the threat or use of military force against them, as 
stated in Articles 2(4) and 2(7) of the UN Charter.23 The second 
requires states to protect their citizens’ fundamental rights and 
freedoms, as declared as one of the purposes of the United Nations in 
its Charter.24  
While humanitarian intervention is, at its core, focused on 
coercive military intervention for humanitarian purposes, R2P is first 
 
19. AIDAN HEHIR, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 1 (2012). 
20. Anne Orford, Lawful Authority and the Responsibility to Protect, in 
LEGALITY AND LEGITIMACY IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS 248, 250 (Richard Falk, Mark 
Juergensmeyer & Vesselin Popovski eds., 2012). 
21. Timely and Decisive Response Vital to Uphold ‘Responsibility to Protect,’ 
UN NEWS CENTRE (Sept. 5, 2012), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsI 
D=42806&Cr=responsibility+to+protect&Cr1=#.UNDDk1HA9UT. 
22. U.N. Secretary-General, We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in 
the Twenty-First Century, ¶ 217, U.N. Doc. A/54/2000 (Mar. 27, 2000). 
23. Julia Hoffman & André Nollkaemper, Introduction to RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT: FROM PRINCIPLE TO PRACTICE 13, 13 (Julia Hoffmann & André 
Nollkaemper eds., 2012). 
24. Id.   
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and foremost dedicated to prevention.25 When the R2P concept was 
first introduced in 2001, its principles were not groundbreaking ideas, 
as they had grown out of the human rights, humanitarian, and human 
security movements of the previous decades.26 French Minister 
Bernard Kouchner, for instance, advocated for the right to interfere in 
humanitarian crises during the 1980s.27 However, what was 
groundbreaking was how R2P shifted the discussion away from its 
“cousin”—humanitarian intervention.28  
The ICISS report put forth the notion that sovereign states have a 
responsibility to protect their citizens from avoidable catastrophes, 
such as murder and starvation, but when they are unwilling or unable 
to provide protection, the responsibility falls to the international 
community.29 While the ICISS report addressed the rules and 
authority for the use of force, its focus was on the “advantages of 
prevention through encouraging States to meet their core protection 
responsibilities.”30 The Commission also broadened the range of 
responses from those that are available under humanitarian 
intervention, which focuses solely on military reaction.31 In sum, the 
ICISS report stated that there are three main elements to a response: 
first, short- and long-term preventive action—to avoid harm in the 
first place; second, reaction—to address the harm when preventive 
 
25. GARETH EVANS, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: ENDING MASS 
ATROCITY CRIMES ONCE AND FOR ALL 56 (2008). 
26. Ruan Zongze, Responsible Protection, CHINA DAILY (Mar. 15, 2012, 8:06 
AM), http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2012-03/15/content_14837835.htm. 
27. EVANS, supra note 25, at 32–33. 
28. Orford, supra note 20, at 248. Humanitarian intervention is the doctrine 
that there is a “‘right to intervene’ militarily in these cases, against the will of the 
government of the country in question.” EVANS, supra note 25, at 3. 
29. Int’l Comm’n on Intervention and State Sovereignty: Responsibility to 
Protect Report, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL. (Dec. 2001), http://www.cfr.org/humani 
tarian-intervention/international-commission-intervention-state-sovereignty-
responsibility-protect-report/p24228. 
30. U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Rep. 
of the Secretary-General, ¶ 9, U.N. Doc. A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009). 
31. Gareth Evans, Co-Chair, Global Ctr. for the Resp. to Protect, President 
Emeritus of the Int’l Crisis Group, former Foreign Minister of Austl., Cent. 
European Sch. of Pub. Policy, Responding to Mass Atrocity Crimes: The 
Responsibility to Protect (R2P) After Libya and Syria (Oct. 24, 2012) (transcript 
available at http://www.gevans.org/speeches/speech496.html).   
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action has failed; and third, post-crisis rebuilding—to prevent a 
recurrence of the harm at issue.32 
B. The 2005 World Summit Outcome Document  
R2P had an “almost unprecedented” acceptance by the 
international community, when more than 150 heads of state and 
government endorsed R2P’s key principles at the UN World Summit 
in 2005.33 The World Summit Outcome Document (Outcome 
Document) of 2005 contained two paragraphs pertaining to R2P—
Paragraphs 138 and 139—which limited the scope of protection to 
four types of crimes: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and 
crimes against humanity.34 Although Paragraphs 138 and 139 upheld 
the core R2P principles,35 the Outcome Document deviated from the 
ICISS report, which referred to “large-scale loss of life,” one of two 
 
32. Id.  
33. Id.  
34. 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶¶ 138–39, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/60/1 (Sept. 16, 2005). Paragraphs 138 and 139 provide as follows: 
138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations 
from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. 
This responsibility entails the prevention of such crimes, including their 
incitement, through appropriate and necessary means. We accept that 
responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international 
community should, as appropriate, encourage and help States to exercise 
this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early 
warning capability.  
139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has 
the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other 
peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VIII of the Charter, 
to help protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing 
and crimes against humanity. In this context, we are prepared to take 
collective action, in a timely and decisive manner, through the Security 
Council, in accordance with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-
by-case basis and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as 
appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities 
manifestly fail to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, 
ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. We stress the need for the 
General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to 
protect populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity and its implications, bearing in mind the 
principles of the Charter and international law. We also intend to commit 
ourselves, as necessary and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to 
protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and 
crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under stress 
before crises and conflicts break out. 
Id. 
35. Id. 
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thresholds capable of activating R2P.36 According to the Outcome 
Document, the international community, through the United Nations, 
has the responsibility to use diplomatic, humanitarian, and other 
peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VII of the UN 
Charter, to protect populations from the four listed mass atrocities.37 
The Security Council, in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter, must be prepared to “take collective action, in a timely and 
decisive manner,” when peaceful means are inadequate, and should 
take such action on a case-by-case basis and in cooperation with the 
relevant regional organizations.38 
According to Gareth Evans, who co-chaired ICISS, the Outcome 
Document’s language was positive in a number of respects.39 First, 
the Outcome Document, more so than the ICISS report, placed 
greater emphasis on prevention and the responsibilities of states to 
assist other states in developing preventive capabilities.40 Second, the 
Outcome Document focused strongly on reactive measures that fall 
short of military action.41 Third, the central role of the United 
Nations, particularly the Security Council, in addressing military 
enforcement was consistent with earlier recommendations.42 Evans 
notes that the “only disappointing omission from the Outcome 
Document is the failure to adopt any criteria for the use of military 
force, leaving the argument for such guidelines to be made another 
day.”43 Unlike the ICISS document, the provisions outlining R2P in 
the Outcome Document neither reintroduced criteria for the use of 
force by the United Nations nor recognized the legality of armed 
humanitarian intervention beyond what the UN Charter previously 
 
36. ICISS, supra note 14, at xii. The second threshold capable of triggering 
R2P is “large scale ‘ethnic cleansing.’” Id. 
37. 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶ 139, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/60/1 (Sept. 16, 2005). 
38. Id.   
39. EVANS, supra note 25, at 47–48. 
40. Id. at 47.  
41. Id. at 47–48. 
42. Id. at 48. 
43. Id.  
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stated.44 These ambiguities regarding military force remain 
unresolved in debates about R2P.45  
C. R2P’s General Acceptance at the United Nations and Adoption 
of its Modern Framework 
Overall, the principles of R2P have “been incorporated into 
United Nations operations in a way that humanitarian intervention 
never was.”46 Secretary General Ban Ki-moon promised soon after 
his appointment in 2007 that he would “spare no effort to 
operationalize [R2P].”47 The General Assembly and Security Council 
have reaffirmed R2P, and regional organizations, such as the 
European Union, have also embraced the concept with seemingly 
more willingness than was the case with humanitarian intervention.48   
There was minimal application and discussion of R2P during the 
period from 2005 to 2009,49 though the doctrine was referred to 
several times during this period. In Resolution 1674, the Security 
Council “reaffirmed” Paragraphs 138 and 139 of the Outcome 
Document in April 2006.50 In Resolution 1706, the Security Council 
applied the R2P principle to a particular context for the first time 
when it called for the deployment of UN peacekeepers to Darfur in 
August 2006.51 In 2008, ethnic-related violence erupted in Kenya 
following allegations that a national election was rigged, and over 
1,000 people were killed and 300,000 people were displaced.52 
Secretary General Ban Ki-moon characterized the events in Kenya as 
an R2P situation, and Genocide Adviser Francis Deng called on 
Kenyan leaders to “meet their responsibility to protect the civilian 
 
44. CRISTINA GABRIELA BADESCU, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE 
RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT 7 (2011). 
45. Gareth Evans, Co-Chair, Global Ctr. for the Resp. to Protect, Mass 
Atrocities and the Use of Force: R2P After Libya and Syria (Oct. 16, 2012) 
(transcript available at http://www.gevans.org/speeches/speech492.html). 
46. Orford, supra note 20, at 252. 
47. Id. at 252–53.  
48. Id. at 253. 
49. HEHIR, supra note 19, at 50. The international community did not use R2P 
to justify military intervention until 2011, when Security Council Resolution 1973 
used R2P to authorize NATO intervention in Libya. Schaper, supra note 10. 
50. S.C. Res. 1674, ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674 (Apr. 28, 2006). 
51. Press Release, Security Council, Security Council Expands Mandate of UN 
Mission in Sudan to Include Darfur, Adopting Resolution 1706 by Vote of 12 in 
Favour, with 3 Abstaining, U.N. Press Release SC/8821 (Aug. 31, 2012). 
52. EVANS, supra note 25, at 51. 
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population.”53 Kofi Annan led a mediation team that negotiated a 
political settlement just a few weeks after the start of the violence.54 
The response was viewed by the United Nations as a success for 
R2P.55  
 Since the ICISS report, R2P has focused less on what its three-
part structure of prevention, response, and rebuild entails, than on 
how to respond.56 Secretary General Ban Ki-moon’s January 2009 
Report on Implementing the Responsibility to Protect (2009 Report) 
gave R2P its now widely accepted terminological framework as three 
principles: (1) a state has a responsibility to protect its population 
from mass atrocities; (2) the international community has a 
responsibility to assist the state if it is unable to protect its population 
on its own; and (3) if the state fails to protect its citizens from mass 
atrocities and peaceful measures have failed, the international 
community has the responsibility to intervene through coercive 
measures such as economic sanctions, and military intervention is 
considered the last resort.57 The 2009 Report, the first comprehensive 
document from the UN Secretariat on R2P, also noted that 
Paragraphs 138 and 139 of the Outcome Document are anchored in 
international law.58 “Under conventional and customary international 
law, States have obligations to prevent and punish genocide, war 
crimes, and crimes against humanity,” and any action in Paragraphs 
138 and 139 must be in conformity with the UN Charter.59 The 2009 
Report also called for the creation of a joint office for the UN Special 





55. Evans, supra note 31. During this time there were also debates about how 
R2P should be applied in Darfur, the Congo, Sri Lanka, the response to the cyclone 
in Myanmar, and Russia’s invasion of South Ossetia. Id. 
56. See Francis M. Deng, The Responsibility While Protecting: Talking Points 
for Remarks 2 (Feb. 21, 2012) (transcript available at http://cpdoc.fgv.br/sites/defau 
lt/files/2012%2002%2021%20Statement%20-%20Francis%20Deng.pdf) (“Recent 
Security Council decisions . . . show that debates now focus on the manner of 
response in implementation of [R2P] rather than on the concept itself.”). 
57. Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Rep. of the Secretary-General, 
supra note 30, ¶ 11. 
58. Id. ¶ 3. 
59. Id.  
60. Id. ¶ 7. 
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In September 2009, the General Assembly adopted a resolution 
that brought R2P back to the forefront, as it “decide[d] to continue its 
consideration of the responsibility to protect.”61 The General 
Assembly debates on R2P, which have occurred annually since 2009, 
have demonstrated a great degree of acceptance of R2P’s principles, 
with only a few voices challenging R2P’s foundation.62 Additionally, 
the Security Council’s decisions in response to the conflicts in Cote 
d’Ivoire, Libya, and Syria illustrate that the focus of the debates 
shifted to how R2P should be implemented, rather than its underlying 
principles.63  
More recently, the September 2012 informal dialogue of the 
General Assembly on the “Report of the Secretary-General on the 
Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive Response” (Response 
Report) focused on R2P’s third principle.64 The Response Report also 
recognizes that while the first and foremost goal is prevention, there 
may be times when “a timely and decisive response is required.”65 
Thus, the focus has shifted to how the tenets of Paragraph 139 are to 
be carried out, how their ambiguities should be resolved, and how 
those tenets should evolve moving forward.66 
D. R2P and Sovereignty 
One of the most controversial aspects of R2P originally was its 
interpretation of sovereignty.67 International law protects and 
guarantees a state’s power over its citizens, which includes the right 
 
61. G.A. Res. 63/308, ¶ 2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/63/308 (Sept. 14, 2009). 
62. Gareth Evans, Co-Chair, Global Ctr. for the Resp. to Protect, R2P and 
RWP After Libya and Syria (Aug. 23, 2012) (transcript available at http://www.gev 
ans.org/speeches/speech485.html). 
63. Deng, supra note 56, at 2. 
64. Press Release, General Assembly, World Not Fulfilling ‘Never Again’ 
Vow, Secretary-General Tells General Assembly Meeting on Responsibility to 
Protect, U.N. Press Release GA/11270, at 3 (Sept. 5, 2012). 
65. U.N. Secretary-General, Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive 
Response, ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/66/874-S/2012/578 (July 25, 2012). 
66. See id. ¶¶14–18 (discussing the administration of R2P). 
67. See Christoph Mikulaschek, Report from the 39th International Institute 
Vienna Seminar on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping, in THE UN SECURITY 
COUNCIL AND THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTE CT: POLICY, PROCESS, AND PRACTICE 
23 (Jan. 15, 2010), http://responsibilitytoprotect.org/mikulaschek.pdf (discussing 
shifting consensuses regarding how sovereignty, under R2P, confers 
responsibilities upon states). 
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“to be free from external meddling or interference.”68 Article 2(7) of 
the UN Charter prohibits the United Nations from intervening in 
matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any 
state.69 However, under R2P, the idea is that international law 
protects citizens when their governments fail grossly in their 
obligations.70 While humanitarian intervention was seen as an 
unacceptable assault on sovereignty, advocates of R2P say its 
principles encourage state involvement in humanitarian relief by 
focusing on responsibility rather than the politically unattractive right 
of state intervention. 71  
Proponents of R2P view sovereignty as a privilege, rather than a 
right.72 Thus, sovereignty does not exclusively protect states from 
foreign interference; instead, sovereignty is a state accountability tool 
that safeguards the welfare of people.73 Such an idea is prevalent in 
Article 1 of the Genocide Convention.74 Francis Deng, whose idea of 
sovereignty as responsibility was adopted in the ICISS report, argued 
that “sovereignty entailed enduring obligations towards one’s people, 
as well as certain international privileges.”75 The United Nations has 
attempted to quiet fears that R2P is as an illegal intrusion into 
sovereignty, as seen in the 2009 Secretary-General’s report that stated 
“the responsibility to protect is an ally of sovereignty, not an 
adversary. It grows from the positive and affirmative notion of 
sovereignty as responsibility, rather than the narrower idea of 
 
68. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Sovereignty and Power in a Networked World 
Order, 40 STAN. J. INT’L L. 283, 284 (2004) (discussing different conceptions of 
sovereignty). 
69. Id.  
70.Anne-Marie Slaughter, Intervention, Libya, and the Future of Sovereignty, 
THE ATLANTIC (Sept. 4, 2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/20 
11/09/intervention-libya-and-the-future-of-sovereignty/244537/. 
71. José E. Alvarez, The Schizophrenias of R2P, in HUMAN RIGHTS, 
INTERVENTION, AND THE USE OF FORCE 285, 285 (Phillip Alston & Euan 
Macdonald eds., 2008). 
72. The Responsibility to Protect, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL ADVISER ON THE 
PREVENTION OF GENOCIDE, http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/ 
responsibility.shtml (last visited Nov. 12, 2013). 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. See Implementing the Responsibility to Protect: Rep. of the Secretary-
General, supra note 30, ¶ 7 (discussing Deng’s idea of sovereignty as 
responsibility). 
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humanitarian intervention.”76 Moreover, some scholars contend that 
history agrees with the United Nation’s interpretation of 
sovereignty.77 Christopher Greenwood, a judge on the International 
Court of Justice, argued that “modern customary international law 
recognizes a right of military intervention on humanitarian grounds 
by states, or an organization like NATO.”78 
E. Libya and Syria: The High and Low Points of R2P79 
While some UN member states viewed the 2011 intervention in 
Libya as a defining moment of R2P and its future development, other 
states viewed the intervention as evidence that R2P may be utilized 
for regime change, thereby raising important questions about the 
powers and limitations of R2P.80 The fear of these states is that R2P 
is “synonymous with regime change and loose resolution 
interpretations.”81  
The intervention in Libya was the first and only occasion thus far 
where the “Security Council invoked [R2P] to authorize the use of 
force by UN member states”82 for human protection objectives 
against the wishes of a functioning state.83 In Resolution 1970, the 
 
76. Id. ¶ 10(a). 
77. See Paul R. Williams et al., Preventing Mass Atrocity Crimes: The 
Responsibility to Protect and the Syria Crisis, 45 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 473, 480 
(2012) (noting that, historically, humanitarian intervention has been regarded as a 
right). 
78. Christopher Greenwood, Humanitarian Intervention: The Case of Kosovo, 
10 FINNISH Y.B. INT’L L. 141, 170 (1999). Greenwood traces such state practice to 
India’s humanitarian intervention in Bangladesh. Id. at 163. 
79. This section assumes a basic understanding of the facts of the NATO 
intervention in Libya in 2011 and the ongoing civil war in Syria. For background 
on Libya, see The Crisis in Libya, INT’L COALITION FOR THE RESP. TO PROTECT, 
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-libya (last visited 
Nov. 12, 2013). For background on Syria, see The Crisis in Syria, INT’L COALITION 
FOR THE RESP. TO PROTECT, http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crise 
s/crisis-in-syria (last visited Nov. 12, 2013). 
80. Hoffman & Nollkaemper, supra note 23, at 9. 
81. Patrick Quinton-Brown, Saving R2P from Syria, CANADIAN INT’L 
COUNCIL (Aug. 14, 2012), http://opencanada.org/features/the-think-tank/comments 
/saving-r2p-from-syria/. 
82. Catherine Powell, Libya: A Multilateral Constitutional Moment?, 106 AM. 
J. INT’L L. 298, 298 (2012). Powell argues that the “transformation away from the 
traditional Westphalian notion of sovereignty has been unfolding for decades, but 
the Libyan case represents a further normative shift from sovereignty as a right to 
sovereignty as a responsibility.” Id. 
83. Alex J. Bellamy & Paul D. Williams, The New Politics of Protection? Côte 
d’Ivoire, Libya and the Responsibility to Protect, 87 INT’L AFF. 825, 825 (2011). 
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Security Council “recalled the Libyan authorities’ responsibility to 
protect their population.”84 Acting under Chapter VII and Article 41 
of the UN Charter, the Security Council levied sanctions against 
Muammar Gaddafi, his family, and accomplices, and imposed an 
embargo on arms destined for Libya.85 Resolution 1973 was the first 
time the Security Council authorized the use of force for human 
protection objectives against the wishes of a functioning state, finding 
that Libya had failed to uphold its responsibility to protect its 
population.86  
The NATO intervention in Libya, according to Secretary Ban 
Ki-moon, showed that “[t]he Responsibility to Protect came of age; 
the principle was tested as never before.”87 While the results may 
have been “uneven,” he argued that tens of thousands of lives were 
saved, thus showing that “human protection is a defining purpose of 
the United Nations in the twenty-first century.”88 Evans views the 
NATO-invasion in Libya as a “textbook example of how R2P is 
supposed to work in the face of a rapidly unfolding mass atrocity 
situation during which early-stage prevention measures no longer 
have any relevance.”89  
Though both the crises in Libya and Syria arose out of the Arab 
Spring,90 the Security Council did not act swiftly in passing 
resolutions or authorizing military force in Syria as it did in Libya.91 
The delay in responding to the Syrian conflict—the Security Council 
did not formally condemn the violence until February 2012, even 
though uprisings began in March 2011—was not just because of the 
geopolitics of Syria or the hesitation of China and Russia, both of 
 
84. Schaper, supra note 10. 
85. John F. Murphy, Responsibility to Protect (R2P) Comes of Age? A 
Sceptic’s View, 18 ILSA J. INT’L & COMP. L. 413, 428 (2012). 
86. Schaper, supra note 10. 
87. Responsibility to Protect: Ban Urges Action to Make UN-Backed Tool ‘A 
Living Reality,’ UN NEWS CENTRE (Jan. 18, 2012), http://www.un.org/apps/news/st 
ory.asp?NewsID=40972&#.UR1v5FF2tUQ. 
88. Id. 
89. Evans, supra note 31. 
90. Maya Bhardwaj, Development of Conflict in Arab Spring Libya and Syria: 
From Revolution to Civil War, 1 WASH. U. INT’L REV. 76, 77 (2012). 
91. Mick B. Krever, Why Won’t the U.N. Security Council Intervene in Syria?, 
CNN  (Jan. 13, 2012, 7:14 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2012/01/13/world/meast/un-
security-council-syria/index.html. 
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which have political ties to the Syrian Government.92 Instead, the 
BRICS group—Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa—who 
all sat on the Security Council in 2011, were the most critical of a 
potential intervention, particularly because of how the intervention in 
Libya occurred.93 Many of the states that voted against or abstained 
from resolutions pertaining to Syria are the same states that “accuse 
the West of abusing the wording of Resolution 1973.”94 They argue 
that the resolution was a mandate “to protect civilians and civilian 
populated areas under threat of attack,” not to bring about regime 
change.95  
The BRICS were less critical of the initial military response of 
attacking Libyan air force infrastructure and ground forces.96 Instead, 
their criticism pointed at what occurred after the initial attacks, when 
it became more apparent that the United States, United Kingdom, and 
France (known collectively as the P3) sought regime change.97 
Specifically, the BRICS asserted that the interveners rejected 
ceasefire offers that should have at least been considered; attacked 
fleeing personnel who posed no immediate harm to civilians; 
attacked locations without any military significance, such as the 
compound containing Gaddafi’s relatives; and supported the rebel 
side in what became a civil war.98 The Security Council resolutions 
that authorized action in Libya “did not authorize outside powers to 
provide air support for subsequent rebelling against Gaddafi.”99 The 
BRICS also argued that “non-coercive measures were not given 
sufficient time to demonstrate results in Libya.”100 Despite the P3 
response as to why such action was necessary, Council members 
were not given enough information at the time to sufficiently evaluate 
such actions.101 Specifically, China and Russia were also critical of 
 
92. See The Crisis in Syria, INT’L COALITION FOR THE RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT, http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/index.php/crises/crisis-in-syria 
(last visited Nov. 13, 2013) (discussing how both China and Russia vetoed 
resolutions to address the violence in Syria). 
93. Evans, supra note 62. 
94. Quinton-Brown, supra note 81.  
95. Stuenkel, supra note 13.   
96. Evans, supra note 62. 
97. Id. 
98. Id.  
99. David Rieff, R2P, R.I.P., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2011), http://www.nytimes.c 
om/2011/11/08/opinion/r2p-rip.html?pagewanted=all. 
100. Responsibility to Protect: Timely and Decisive Response, supra note 65, ¶ 
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101. Evans, supra note 62. 
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the interpretation of the mandate in Libya, with Russia arguing that 
the bombing campaign sparked by the Revolution caused civilian 
casualties and such a use of force was not in strict compliance with 
the resolution.102 Furthermore, South Africa later argued that the 
International Criminal Court should examine the actions taken in 
implementing Resolution 1973.103 
While some diplomats and scholars, such as Ban Ki-moon and 
Evans, see Libya as a crowning success for R2P in action, others 
view the NATO intervention as the epitome of R2P’s potential for 
military operationalization, which hurts R2P’s normative credibility 
among those emerging powers that cautioned against the use of 
military force.104 The BRICS thus view this as a warning against 
further similar incidents.105 During the operation in Libya, BRICS 
diplomats were allegedly treated dismissively and kept uninformed, 
and such humiliation seems to be a proximate cause of the 
development of RwP.106  
 Given the Security Council’s limited response in Syria, many 
scholars have come to view R2P as unsuccessful,107 and therefore 
Syria shows the limitations of R2P.108 From the start of the violence, 
the United Nations used R2P to describe the conflict, issuing a 
statement regarding Syria, reminding “the Government of Syria of its 
ongoing responsibility to protect its population.”109 The statement 
 
102. LUÍS PAULO BOGLIOLO PIANCASTELLI DE SIQUEIRA, THE RESPONSIBILITY 
TO PROTECT AND THE RESPONSIBILITY WHILE PROTECTING: AN ANALYSIS OF 
HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD 15–16 (Aug. 20, 
2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2201588. 
103. Id. at 16.  
104. Rieff, supra note 99. 
105. Thomas Wright, Brazil Hosts Workshop on ‘Responsibility While 
Protecting,’ FOREIGN POL’Y (Aug. 29, 2012, 11:29 AM), http://bosco.foreignpolicy 
.com/posts/2012/08/29/brazil_backs_responsibility_while_protecting. 
106. Id.  
107. See Zack Beauchamp, Syria’s Crisis and the Future of R2P, FOREIGN 
POL’Y (Mar. 16, 2012, 2:15 PM), http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2012/03/1 
6/syrias_crisis_and_the_future_of_r2p (“[S]keptics and defenders of invoking 
[R2P] can agree: Syria has put [R2P] . . . in crisis.”). Beauchamp, however, argues 
that Syria should not be viewed as a failure for R2P. Id. 
108. Williams et al., supra note 77, at 476. 
109. Press Release, Special Advisers of the United Nations Secretary-General 
on the Prevention of Genocide, Francis Deng, and on the Responsibility to Protect, 
Edward Luck, on the situation in Syria (June 2, 2011). 
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also called for “an independent, thorough, and objective investigation 
into all alleged violations of international human rights law.”110 In 
October 2011, the Security Council failed to adopt a resolution that 
would have: (1) condemned the human rights violations in Syria; (2) 
warned that action might be considered if warranted under the 
unfolding situation; and (3) demanded that Syrian authorities 
immediately ended the violence.111 The resolution was vetoed by 
China and Russia; Brazil, India, Lebanon, and South Africa 
abstained.112 China and Russia composed their own resolution which 
focused on respecting sovereignty and non-intervention, the unity of 
Syrians, and reaching peace through socio-economic reforms.113 
South Africa indicated it was “concerned by the imposition of 
punitive measures on Syria” fearing they were part of a hidden 
agenda for regime change.114 
Syria is “an urgent test here and now” for the R2P doctrine, 
according to the Secretary-General.115 The Security Council’s 
“paralysis does the Syrian people harm, damages its own credibility, 
and weakens a concept that was adopted with such hope and 
expectations.”116  
Some diplomats have argued that in assessing how to assist the 
people in Syria, there are diplomatic, legal, and economic means that 
could be used to end the violence, serving as a middle ground 
between non-involvement and military intervention.117 However, 
until non-Western countries, like the BRICS, no longer view R2P as 
a vehicle for regime change, finding such a middle ground remains 
unlikely. For instance, most recently, Russian President Vladimir 
Putin justified Russia’s invasion into Ukraine’s Crimean Peninsula by 
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Resolution Condemning Syria’s Crackdown on Anti-Government Protestors, 
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invoking R2P.118 Putin’s invocation of R2P illustrates the fear that 
the BRICS have: the R2P doctrine is being used to mask military 
aggression as humanitarian intervention. Such an invocation of R2P 
demonstrates the necessity to further define—and create boundaries 
to—the R2P doctrine.  
II. RESPONSIBILITY WHILE PROTECTING  
In September 2011, the government of Brazil proposed a new 
concept, Responsibility while Protecting (RwP), the first major 
reexamination of R2P since its conception.119 RwP takes the view 
that the international community must demonstrate a high level of 
responsibility when it exercises its duty to protect citizens from mass 
atrocities.120 The concept was introduced in September 2011 at the 
66th General Assembly by Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff, which 
preceded the concept note presented to the UN Security Council on 
November 9, 2011.121 RwP arose out of the perception by Brazil and 
other non-Western powers that R2P may be “misused for purposes 
other than protecting civilians, such as regime change.”122 Therefore, 
in many ways, RwP is an attempt to answer some questions and 
address the ambiguities and problems of R2P. 
Brazil’s concept paper begins by emphasizing that all diplomatic 
solutions should be exhausted before military action is used.123 
Moreover, “a comprehensive and judicious analysis of the possible 
consequences of military action on a case-by-case basis” should be 
conducted before the use of force is employed.124 The concept paper 
recognizes and cautions against the harm that has occurred from 
interventions, such as aggravating existing conflicts, permitting 
 
118. Transcript: Putin Defends Russian Intervention in Ukraine, WASH. POST 
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120. Ambassador Maria Luiza Ribeiro Viotti, Letter dated Nov. 9, 2011 from 
the Permanent Representative of Brazil to the United Nations addressed to the 
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123. Id. ¶ 7. 
124. Id.  
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terrorism to spread to new places, giving rise to new violence, and 
increasing the vulnerability of civilians.125 After providing the 
background supporting RwP, Brazil’s concept paper provides a list of 
“fundamental principles, parameters and procedures,” from which 
R2P and RwP can evolve together.126 The first principle, in line with 
the UN Charter and as stated in the 2005 World Summit Outcome, is 
that prevention is always the best course of action, and all peaceful 
means should be exhausted in an effort to protect civilians threatened 
by violence.127 Next, the use of force “must always be authorized by 
the Security Council, in accordance with Chapter VII of the UN 
Charter,” or by the General Assembly, under extraordinary 
circumstances.128 Such authorization of force must be limited, and the 
scope of military action should abide by the mandate given by the 
Security Council or General Assembly and be carried out in 
conformity with international law.129 Furthermore, the use of force 
should generate as little violence and instability as possible and not 
succeed the harm it was authorized to prevent.130 Lastly, the Security 
Council needs to improve procedures to monitor and assess how 
resolutions are interpreted and implemented to help ensure the 
accountability of those states to which the use of force is granted.131 
In sum, RwP emphasizes prevention above all and calls for 
changes to the role of the Security Council in following an R2P 
mandate. Particularly, before any action is taken under the third pillar 
of R2P and under Chapter VII of the UN Charter, the Security 
Council must give “more formal and systematic attention” to 
prudential guidelines and criteria.132 Once such action is taken, 
enhanced Council procedures should be employed to “monitor and 
assess the manner in which [the] mandates are . . . implemented.”133  
Despite the attention RwP received upon its presentation in late 
2011,134 neither Brazil nor the United Nations have formally 
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advanced shaping or developing this doctrine.135 Most significantly, 
on February 21, 2012, the Brazilian Permanent Mission held an 
informal discussion with Member States, UN actors, and civil society 
organizations to discuss RwP.136 Minister Antonio de Aguiar Patriota 
stated that the United Nations has an obligation to develop an 
awareness of the dangers involved when force is used and to create 
mechanisms that provide a detailed assessment of these dangers and 
ways to protect citizens.137 Most recently, there was discussion of 
RwP during the annual dialogue of R2P in September 2012.138 
Although several delegates expressed their support for RwP, there 
was no formal discussion of RwP nor was RwP the central theme. 
A. Norm competition? RwP versus R2P 
One of the earliest concerns about RwP was that it was not clear 
whether it was an attempt to challenge and detract from the decade of 
development of R2P as an emerging norm or a means to foster 
dialogue about R2P.139 However, Ambassador Ribeiro’s speech 
makes clear that RwP was not an attempt to challenge R2P, but rather 
a contribution to the conceptual framework of R2P that was already 
in place.140 Moreover, in its concept paper, Brazil indicated it was not 
attempting to challenge R2P, but was merely attempting to clarify 
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it.141 RwP was intended, instead, to become “a component of R2P’s 
third-pillar vocabulary,” rather than developing into a separate norm 
itself.142 While the fear does exist that a new concept like RwP may 
detract from R2P,143 the greater consensus has been that RwP, if 
understood as providing suggestions for implementing R2P, will 
“sharpen the debate” of how to best respond to situations that warrant 
the invocation of R2P.144  
While Brazil may not have intended its RwP doctrine to compete 
with the R2P doctrine, there are differences between the doctrines 
that raise important questions. RwP requires full exhaustion of non-
coercive means before more robust action is taken, whereas Secretary 
General Ban Ki-moon’s R2P focuses on “early and flexible 
responses.”145 RwP also proposes adopting military intervention 
guidelines that were not unanimously endorsed by Member States in 
the World Summit Outcome Document.146   
B. Member States Respond to RwP 
RwP did not receive overwhelming support upon introduction, 
though there has been a generally positive response to the proposal 
over the last couple of years.147 Western states have overall been less 
supportive of RwP than non-Western states, like the BRICS, who are 
more wary of intervention. The Netherlands noted that over-planning 
may delay action and allow the atrocities to escalate.148 The German 
Ambassador raised his own concerns, noting that RwP limits the 
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ability to take timely and decisive actions in important situations.149 
The Ambassador publicly stated that RwP limits the scope for timely 
solutions because of “its prescription of a strict chronological 
sequencing, the mandatory exhaustion of all peaceful means, and the 
introduction of ‘exceptional circumstances’ as an additional 
qualifying trigger.”150 
Some American diplomats see RwP as “anti-American banter,” 
while others believe that with some edits it could help to create a new 
standard.151 The United States was critical of the “higher thresholds 
for the legitimacy of military intervention, such as the requirement 
that [R2P’s] three pillars follow a strict line of political subordination 
and chronological sequencing."152 The United States agrees with 
RwP’s notion that “‘prevention is always the best policy’ and [that] 
preventative diplomacy needs to be strengthened.”153 However, the 
United States has highlighted two of the elements of RwP with which 
it disagrees. First, the United States argues that it is a mistake to 
“equate ‘manifest failure’ with strict chronological sequence.”154 
There should instead be a “comprehensive assessment of risks and 
costs and the balance of consequences” when making decisions, 
rather than just “‘temporal’ considerations.”155 Second, the United 
States disagrees with the idea that in “circumstances where collective 
action is necessary, diplomacy should be considered ‘exhausted.’”156 
Conversely, both China and India have “welcomed” RwP,157 and 
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Russia is committed to “participat[ing] constructively in developing 
[the] idea” of RwP.158 
The only organized UN dialogue on RwP thus far was an 
informal discussion coordinated by the Permanent Mission of Brazil 
on RwP on February 21, 2012.159 The consensus was that RwP was 
welcomed as a means of enhancing R2P’s implementation, but R2P’s 
framework, as set out in the World Summit Outcome Document, was 
not to be renegotiated.160 
III. MOVING FORWARD: RWP’S CONTRIBUTION TO R2P  
RwP raises important considerations for the future of R2P and 
should be embraced as a dialogue regarding R2P, not as a competing 
norm. Gareth Evans, for instance, believes that the RwP proposal, 
with further development, can play a critical role in advancing R2P as 
an accepted international norm.161 R2P has the potential to become a 
norm of international law, but after Libya and Syria, the doctrine of 
R2P is unlikely to take this step without incorporating some elements 
from RwP.162 The growing perception that R2P is at its core about 
 
“[I]n the implementation of the Council’s mandate for protecting 
civilians, there is the need to ensure the responsibility while protecting. 
The recent actions of some organizations and member-states have brought 
to the fore a considerable sense of unease about the manner in which the 
humanitarian imperative of protecting civilians has been interpreted for 
actual action on the ground. Monitoring of the manner in which the 
Council’s mandates are implemented has, therefore, assumed great 
significance and importance.”  
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regime change makes it more challenging for the international 
community to achieve its protection objectives.163 While RwP is 
unlikely to put an end to Security Council deadlock, it can address 
some of the rhetoric hindering R2P’s normative development: “[i]f 
dissenters no longer fear R2P’s ambiguities of implementation, they 
can more confidently employ R2P language in UN debates and 
approve related resolutions.”164 The BRICS felt bruised by P3’s 
dismissiveness during the Libya campaign, and these “bruises will 
have to heal before any consensus can be expected on tough 
responses to such situations in the future.”165  
The most notable elements of RwP that should be incorporated 
into R2P are the strengthening of prevention and the need for 
accountability and assessment in the Security Council.166 Above all, 
RwP seeks a renewed focus on prevention.167 While rhetoric does 
exist already in the R2P doctrine on prevention, there is a 
demonstrated need for firm strategies.168 Scholar Alex Bellamy 
suggests three elements of prevention: first, improvements in 
capacity building, specifically examining what the United Nations 
does to assist with the prevention of mass atrocities and how 
capacities can be strengthened to fill in the current gaps; second, a 
need to strengthen the United Nation’s early warning and early 
assessment capabilities, leading to an additional need for resources 
besides those currently provided to the Joint Office to improve 
analytical capacity; and third, a focus on prevention of genocide and 
mass atrocities, which needs to be “mainstreamed into the work of 
the whole UN system.”169  
The need for greater accountability and assessment in the 
Security Council is based on the BRICS’ allegations that the P3 
expanded the mandate in Libya to regime change, and the BRICS 
request better procedures in how the Security Council holds states 
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166. Alex Bellamy, R2P—Dead or Alive?, in THE RESPONSIBILITY TO 
PROTECT—FROM EVASIVE TO RELUCTANT ACTION? THE ROLE OF GLOBAL MIDDLE 
POWERS 11, 22–23, 25 (Malte Brosig ed., 2012), available at http://www.issafrica.o 
rg/uploads/FromEvasiveReluctantAction.pdf. 
167. Id. at 22. 
168. Id. 
169. Id. at 23. 
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accountable that act on its mandates.170 Bellamy criticizes the 
BRICS’ procedural requests, arguing that such changes would result 
in a change to the UN Charter and would make it more difficult for 
the Security Council to reach a consensus in a timely manner.171 
However, measures that could be taken to strengthen accountability 
include having the Security Council write “accountability measures 
into its resolutions” based on the particular issue, which parallels 
RwP’s focus on stronger analysis in making decisions.172 Bellamy 
suggests that the UN Secretariat should be tasked with assessing the 
best responses to situations and providing briefings to the Security 
Council on emerging solutions and possible options.173  
Additionally, the Security Council should adopt a set of criteria, 
including an enhanced monitoring and review process that will 
encourage debate among Security Council members and ensure the 
proper implementation of mandates that call for the use of military 
force.174 Regarding criteria, Evans suggests that the unimplemented 
recommendations of the ICISS Commission and the reports that 
followed listed five specific prudential guidelines that the Security 
Council should consider before authorizing any coercive military 
action under Chapter VII of the Charter, instead of only in R2P 
situations.175 Evans recognizes the criticism of such guidelines may 
be that “‘rigid criteria’ [are] impossible to apply” in real world 
situations; his response is that these critiques “overstate the case, and 
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175. Id. The five specific guidelines are:  
First, seriousness of risk: is the harm occurring or being threatened of such 
a kind and scale as to justify prima facie the use of force? Second, primary 
purpose: is the use of force primarily intended to halt or avert the threat in 
question, whatever secondary motives might be in play for different 
states? Third, last resort: has every non-military option been fully explored 
and the judgment reasonably made that nothing less than military force 
could halt or avert the harm in question? Fourth, proportionality: are the 
scale, duration, and intensity of the proposed military action the minimum 
necessary to meet the threat? And fifth, balance of consequences: will 
those at risk ultimately be better or worse off, and the scale of suffering 
greater or less? Will more good than harm be done?  
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sometimes simply conceal a preference for behaving in a completely 
ad hoc fashion.”176  
Regarding process, explicit R2P mandates like Resolution 1973 
leave the responsibility to implement the mandate to the large, 
powerful states that are unlikely to welcome close scrutiny of their 
operations.177 However, such states should have an obligation to 
regularly check back with the Security Council to provide an update 
on how the mandate is being interpreted and the progress of the 
operation, thereby permitting debate on how the mandate is being 
carried out.178 These reports would be less about holding states 
legally accountable, but more about recognizing that destructive 
skepticism about interventions will grow “unless the courts of 
rationality, public opinion and peer group understanding can be 
broadly satisfied.”179 
Ultimately, with a renewed focus on prevention, there needs to 
be compromise among states. Western states that may favor 
intervention should “provid[e] real resources to strengthening 
preventive capacities.”180 States that are skeptical of intervention 
should be more willing to act earlier to deal with an imminent crisis 
and allow for an earlier response from the international 
community.181 
While the government of Brazil was in the best position to 
continue the dialogue about RwP, as it originally presented the 
concept and it co-led an informal dialogue on RwP in early 2012, it 
has failed to update the concept note or further advance RwP.182 
Other nations, particularly developing powers, should work to gain 
support for RwP and its development, given that “R2P only 
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        CONCLUSION  
 For R2P to become a universally accepted international norm, 
Western states should consider what elements of RwP could be 
incorporated into their understanding of R2P. While it is premature 
for scholars to declare “R2P, R.I.P,”184 the deadlock in the Security 
Council over what action to take in Syria has allowed the Syrian 
Government to continue committing crimes against humanity.185 
While R2P’s framework may be nearly universally accepted, 
operationalizing the concept is not, as demonstrated in Syria. This is 
due in large part to hesitation by non-Western states fearful of 
intervening, particularly after NATO’s intervention in Libya. If non-
Western states have contributed to and accepted R2P, it is less likely 
that there will be future delays like the one in Syria. RwP suggests 
that implementing R2P does not necessarily need to look like the 
Libyan campaign in the future, and instead a compromise can be 
reached that focuses on prevention, and pre-intervention guidelines 
and criteria that are flexible enough to secure the agreement of 
Western states. The world must not return to the days of the 
Holocaust, Rwanda, or Srebrenica where governments commit mass 
atrocities against their own citizens. R2P provides promise as an 
international norm capable of preventing the reoccurrence of such 
human rights abuses, but in order to get support from the 
international community at large, the doctrine of R2P should 
incorporate RwP principles.  
 
184. Rieff, supra note 99. 
185. Howard LaFranchi, Deadlock on Syria: Likely Crimes Against Humanity, 
But No Plan of Action, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Feb. 13, 2012), www.csmonitor. 
com/USA/Foreign-Policy/2012/0213/Deadlock-on-Syria-Likely-crimes-against-
humanity-but-no-plan-of-action/. 
